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Mind the Gap: 
A Detailed Picture of the Immigrant-Native Earnings Gap 
in the UK Using Longitudinal Data Between 1978 and 2006
* 
 
Using the underexplored, sizeable and long Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB) we 
estimated the immigrant-native earnings gap across the entire earnings distribution, across 
continents of nationality and across cohorts of arrival in the UK between 1978 and 2006. We 
exploited the longitudinal nature of our data to separate the effect of observed and 
unobserved individual characteristics on earnings. This helped us to prevent selectivity 
biases such as cohort bias and survivor bias, which have been long standing unresolved 
identification issues in the literature. In keeping with the limited existing UK literature, we 
found a clear and wide dividing line between whites and non-whites in simple comparable 
models. However, in our more complete models we found a much narrower and subtler 
dividing line. This confirms the importance of accounting for unobservable individual 
characteristics, which is an important contribution of this paper. It also suggests that the 
labour market primarily rewards individual characteristics other than immigration status. We 
also found that the lowest paid immigrants, whom are disproportionately non-white, suffer an 
earnings penalty in the labour market, whereas higher paid immigrants, whom are 
disproportionately white, do not. Finally, we found less favourable earning gaps for cohorts 
that witnessed proportionately larger non-white and lower paid white immigration. 
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1. Introduction 
The  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  matters.  It  matters  because  is  a  measure  of  the 
absorption of economic immigrants into the labour market and into society more generally. 
For example, the immigration debate is more heated in countries where economic immigrants 
are  perceived  as  a  threat  to  natives'  job  opportunities.  This  is  the  case,  for  instance,  if 
immigrants are unskilled and work for comparatively lower wages. In contrast, in countries 
where  economic  immigrants  are  perceived  as  filling  up  vacancies  where  there  is  labour 
shortage, they are seen as contributing to the economy. In this case, their skills might be 
favourably rewarded and they might work for comparatively higher wages. 
The direction of such earnings gap, therefore, is a measure of how immigrants fare in the 
labour market – and this informs policymaking. Therefore, a careful and detailed analysis of 
the immigrant-native earnings gap right across the board is the first step to understand the 
effects of immigration on the labour market and on the economy more generally. Yet, there is 
very limited evidence on such a crucial labour market issue in the UK. In his pioneering 
paper, Chiswick (1980) alerted for such scarcity in the UK literature. Nevertheless, 30 years 
on and less than a handful of papers have followed (Bell 1997; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005; 
Dickens and McKnight 2008). Furthermore, this rather small literature is sometimes hindered 
by the use of unsophisticated models of average gaps and by limitations in the data.
2 
The main contribution of this paper is to help to fill this blank in the literature and to 
inform policymaking in the face of continuing public debate on immigration policy in the UK. 
We estimate the immigrant-native earnings gap across the entire earnings distribution. This 
allows us to uncover potential earnings gaps at particular points along the distribution that 
might have been masked by the average gap. We also estimate the immigrant-native earnings 
gap  by  gender,  by  continent  of  nationality  and  by  cohort  of  arrival.  This  allows  us  to 
investigate  whether  the  earnings  gap  is  affected  by  immigrants'  origins  or  by  economic 
conditions in the UK at the time of their arrival.  
                                            
2 Although the corresponding literature is quite large for the US (Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985, 1995 and 1999; 
Butcher and DiNardo 2002; Cortes 2004; Chiswick et al. 2005; etc.), it is limited for the UK. Using data from 
the 1972 General Household Survey (GHS) to estimate a standard human capital earnings model, Chiswick 
(1980) found no earnings gap for white but a -25% gap for non-white male immigrants. In an attempt to model 
cohort and assimilation effects separately, Bell (1997) used 1973-1992 GHS data and broadly confirmed these 
earlier findings. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005) estimated a simple model using data from the 1979-2004 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and expanded the analysis to include females. They found that the wage gap for non-white 
immigrants was as large as -40%, though this varied with immigrants' region of origin. Dickens and McKnight 
(2008)  estimated  an  unrefined  model  using  data  from  the  1978-2003  Lifetime  Labour  Market  Database 
(LLMDB) and found surprisingly large and negative wage gaps for all immigrants. In particular, they found a 
large wage penalty for white (European) immigrants, which is not in line with the UK or international literature.  2 
 
Interestingly, there is something of a correspondence between immigrants' continent of 
nationality, their cohort of arrival and the section of the earnings distribution where they end 
up at. For example, whereas many of the high skilled North Americans that arrived during the 
1990s and 2000s ended up at the top of the earnings distribution, many of the low skilled 
Eastern  Europeans  that  arrived  in  the  2000s  ended  up  at  the  bottom  of  the  distribution. 
Therefore, our detailed and comprehensive analysis provides an invaluable insight into the 
same phenomenon from three different angles. 
Another contribution of this paper is to exploit a sizeable and long longitudinal dataset that 
has been yet largely unused in the UK immigration literature. The Lifetime Labour Market 
Database  (LLMDB)  combines  anonymised  administrative  tax  records  and  social  security 
records into a dataset that tracks a random sample of 647,000 individuals between 1978 and 
2006.  Given  that  data  limitations  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  scarce  evidence  on 
immigration  for  the  UK,  exploiting  such  a  unique  dataset  is  a  timely  contribution.  For 
example,  while  the  LLMDB  is  large  enough  to  allow  disaggregation  by  continent  of 
nationality  and  by  cohort  of  arrival,  as  well  as  by  small  geographical  areas,  the  more 
commonly used GHS (General Household Survey) and LFS (Labour Force Survey) do not 
permit such fine levels of disaggregation.  
Another important contribution of this paper is that the longitudinal nature of our data 
helps circumvent identification issues that have long posed difficulties in the literature. One 
such identification issue is controlling for individual specific time invariant (fixed) effects. If 
immigrants are more able, more motivated or work harder than natives, then these unobserved 
individual  characteristics  could  bias  the  earnings  gap  estimates.  Other  such  selection 
arguments include changes over time in unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' skills and 
return migration of immigrants that are less able (along with other types of data attrition). 
Concern with biases implied by these various types of selectivity in the data, such as cohort 
bias and survivor bias, have occupied much of the literature for the last 30 years (Chiswick 
1978  and  1980;  Carliner  1980;  Borjas  1985,  1994  and  1999;  Duleep  and  Regets  1997; 
Chiswick et al. 2005). This literature has long recognized that the ideal way to address such 
selectivity biases is to use sufficiently large and long longitudinal data – which has, however, 
been very scarce. Therefore, using the LLMDB to control for individual fixed effects when 
estimating the immigrant-natives earnings gap is a timely contribution, as it enables us to 
separate the effect of individual unobserved characteristics from the effect of other observed 
variables (such as gender, age, continent of nationality, cohort of arrival, etc.) on earnings. 3 
 
Indeed, the results are striking. In keeping with the existing UK literature (Chiswick 1980; 
Bell 1997; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005), we found a clear and wide dividing line between 
whites and non-whites when we estimated the earnings gap using simple models. In our base 
model, non-white immigrants earned between 16.5% and 21.8% less than natives, whereas 
white immigrants earned up to 26.5% more than natives. However, as we estimated more 
complete  models,  our  earnings  gap  estimates  narrowed  and  became  smaller  than  those 
available  in  the  existing  UK  literature.  In  our  preferred  model,  where  we  control  for 
observable and unobservable individual characteristics, the gap for non-whites is 0%, whereas 
it is between 2.9% and 10.7% for whites. This suggests a much narrower and subtler dividing 
line,  confirming  the  importance  of  accounting  for  observable  as  well  as  unobservable 
individual characteristics, which is an important contribution of this paper. It also suggests 
that the labour market  primarily  rewards individual characteristics other than immigration 
status.  
When we estimated the gap across the earnings distribution, we found that it was between     
-7.4% and 0.7% below the median, where non-white immigrants are overrepresented, and 
between 2.4% and 8.7% above the median, where white immigrants are overrepresented. This 
suggests that most immigrants do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty in the labour market. 
It  confirms  that,  except  for  the  lowest  and  highest  paid  immigrants,  the  labour  market 
primarily rewards individual characteristics other than the immigration status. 
Finally, we found less favourable gaps for cohorts that witnessed proportionately larger 
non-white and lower paid white immigration. For example, the earnings gap is between -1.7% 
and  0%  for  the  1985-1994  cohorts,  when  there  was  proportionately  large  non-white 
immigration (although this period also coincides with greater, lower paid, white immigration 
following the enlargement of the EU in the mid 1980s when Greece, Portugal and Spain 
joined  in).  This  contrasts  with  an  earnings  gap  between  3.7%  to  8.6%  following 
proportionately  large  white  immigration  in  the  1995-2004  cohorts,  when  EU  immigration 
increased  –  accelerating  dramatically  after  a  further  enlargement  in  the  mid  2000s  when 
Eastern  European  countries  joined  in  –  along  with  increased  immigration  from  North 
America,  Australasia  and  Oceania  (though  this  period  also  witnessed  greater  non-white 
immigration from Africa, Asia and the Middle East).  
We thoroughly discuss the above issues in the remainder of this paper. In Section 2 we 
depict our data. In Section 3 we specify our empirical model and carefully discuss several 
identification  issues.  In  Section  4  we  summarise  the  results.  In  Section  5  we  discuss  our 4 
 
results in light of the existing literature before we conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Data   
We  use  data  from  the  Lifetime  Labour  Market  Database  (LLMDB).  The  LLMDB  is 
derived from several administrative datasets linked together by a unique individual identifier, 
the national insurance number (NINo). Individuals must apply for a NINo in order to pay tax 
(income tax, national insurance contributions, self-employment contributions, etc.), receive 
retirement pension, or claim social security benefits (e.g. unemployment benefit, incapacity 
benefit,  sickness  benefit,  maternity  benefit,  child  benefit,  housing  benefit,  etc.).  Whereas 
natives are automatically given a NINo just before they turn 16 years of age, which is derived 
from  their  child  benefit  number,  immigrants  typically  apply  for  a  NINo  when  they  start 
interacting with the system, either by paying taxes or by claiming benefits. ("Natives" and 
"Immigrants"  here  and  throughout  the  paper  are  respectively  UK  born  and  overseas  born 
nationals.)  Because  individuals  need  to  produce  their  NINo  in  every  interaction  with  the 
system,  the  LLMDB  effectively  tracks  individuals  throughout  their  lifetime  –  and  more 
crucially, throughout their working lives.  
The  main  advantage  of  the  LLMDB,  therefore,  is  that  it  is  a  rich,  long  and  large 
longitudinal  dataset.  It  has  high  levels  of  accuracy  and  relatively  low  levels  of  attrition 
(individuals only drop out of the sample if they neither pay taxes nor claim any benefit nor 
receive retirement pension for more than 12 months; they re-enter the sample when they again 
interact with the system). Our LLMDB sample comprises 647,068 individuals (a 1% random 
sample of NINo records) followed between the tax-years 1978 and 2006 (which run from 
April to March) resulting in 11,061,433 observations (a fresh cohort of individuals enters the 
data every year and is followed from then on). We restricted our sample to those aged 25 to 
64, as is common in the earnings gap literature (though the results were robust when including 
those  aged  16  to  64).  We  also  restricted  our  sample  to  those  earning  between  £100  and 
£1000000 in any one tax-year (this excludes the self-employed, for whom we do not observe 
earnings). We also restricted our sample to immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards, because 
the number of immigrants arriving previously was relatively very low and because restricting 
the sample facilitates cohort modelling, which we discuss in Section 3. Finally, we restricted 
our sample to those observed at least twice, due to the way we control for individual fixed 
effects, which we discuss in detail in Section 3 (although our results were robust to including 
individuals  observed  only  once).  Our  final  working  sample  therefore  consists  of  433,069 5 
 
individuals,  45,309  of  whom  are  immigrants,  as  shown  in  Table  1.  The  total  number  of 
observations is 5,373,086 and the average number of observations for natives (immigrants) is 
15.76 (18.71). Figure 1 shows the distribution of natives and immigrants across tax-years.  
The LLMDB contains well over 400 variables, including date of birth, date of death, age, 
gender, address, nationality, country which immigrants arrived from, immigrants' entry date,
3 
immigrants'  age  at  entry,  number  of  jobs  in  the  year,  annual  earnings  per  job,  type  of 
employment (employee or self-employed), number of weeks employed (unemployed) in the 
year, dates of spells of unemployment, dates of spells of receipt of benefits, benefit type, 
pension contributions, pension entitlements, etc. As is common with administrative data, the 
LLMDB does not contain information on education. In this paper we circumvent this issue to 
some extent by restricting our sample to those in work aged 25 to 64, who, we assume, have 
completed their education, and by modelling individual fixed effects, as we discuss in Section 
3. In addition, the LLMDB does not contain information on the immigrants' entry route (work 
permit, student visa, family reunification, etc.) or on their departure date. Since in this paper 
we focus on those already in work, their entry route is not crucial, although some limited 
information on such a route can be gauged from their first few interactions with the system. 
Similarly, since we are focusing on those in work, differentiating whether an immigrant left 
the labour force or left the country is not crucial here, although it might be very relevant 
elsewhere. 
Table 1 shows that natives are older than immigrants, are more evenly spread across the 
country, are more likely to be employed and slightly less likely to be unemployed, and earn 
more on average. Figure 2 shows the immigrant-native average real earnings gap across tax-
years, confirming that on average immigrants earned less than natives during most of the 
sample period, although the variation is large. Figure 2 also shows that the earnings gap is 
greater and more negative for male immigrants.  
Table 1 also shows that immigrants arrive young and many remain for several years. Those 
at the very bottom of the earnings distribution earn less whereas those at the very top earn 
more than natives. This is confirmed in Figure 3, which shows the immigrant-native real 
earnings  gap  across  tax-years  for  several  percentiles  of  the  earnings  distribution.  Whilst 
immigrants at the bottom of the distribution can earn less than a half of what natives at the 
bottom of the distribution earn, those at the top can earn up to a quarter more than natives at 
                                            
3 The entry date is only recorded when the immigrant applies for a NINo, which depends on her individual 
circumstances and might not happen immediately upon arrival. Existing internal checks in the data and our own 
analysis suggest that the associated measurement error is fairly limited, especially after 1997.  6 
 
the top earn. The earnings gap for the lower paid becomes more negative over time, especially 
after 2003, which coincides with the inflow of low paid Eastern Europeans. In contrast, the 
earnings gap for the higher paid becomes more positive over time, especially around 2000, 
following the inflow of high paid North Americans during the 1990s and 2000s. This is also 
confirmed  in  Figure  4,  which  shows  that  the  immigrants'  earnings  distribution  becomes 
relatively more dispersed over time.  
Table 1 also shows that immigrants predominantly come from the European Union (EU), 
Asia and the Middle East, and Africa, and that there are marginally proportionately more 
white than non-white immigrants. Figure 5 confirms that these overall patterns persist across 
tax-years, although the proportion of non-whites increases over time. Interestingly, Table 1 
shows  that  immigration  intensified  after  the  mid  1970s.
4  Figure  6  plots  the  inflow  of 
immigrants by year of arrival and continent of nationality.
5 Most cohorts display a mix of 
white  and  non-white  immigrants.  For  example,  during  the  1950s  and  1960s,  white  EU 
immigrants (mainly Irish) and non-white immigrants from former colonies (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladeshi,  South  Africa,  Nigeria,  etc.)  came  to  the  UK  to  help  with  the  post-war 
reconstruction effort. There were also other minority groups, such as Jews fleeing to the UK 
and refugees from Kenya, Uganda, etc. During the 1970s this overall trend continued, with 
increased EU immigration, especially after 1973, when the UK joined the EU. In this period 
there was also an increased inflow of immigrants from India (mainly because Gujarati Indians 
were expelled from Uganda) and from Vietnam and South East Asia. During the 1980s and 
1990s white immigration increased proportionately more, following the enlargement of the 
EU  when  Greece  (in  1981)  and  Portugal  and  Spain  (in  1986)  joined  in,  and  following 
increases in the inflow of immigrants from North America, Australasia and Oceania. In that 
period non-white immigration, mainly from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, also increased. 
In the late 1990s and 2000s white immigration from the EU, North America, Australasia and 
Oceania  continued  to  increase  strongly,  more  dramatically  after  2004,  when  ten  Eastern 
                                            
4 Although our sample period is between 1978 and 2006, the last cohort is four years short, by construction, 
since all those arriving in 2006 were dropped from the sample because they were only observed once. 
5 Although the LLMDB is more reliable after 1975, and more reliable still after 1997, Figure 6 plots the inflow 
from 1945 onwards. The overall number of immigrants is fairly reliable, but their continent of nationality was 
not always imputed. The rather large spikes in the series of "unknown" continent of nationality in Figure 6 
reflects  the introduction of new computing  systems  when inputting  fields such as country of  nationality of 
immigrants was not a priority. For example, the spike in 1975 reflects immigrants that arrived in the immediately 
preceding years (that is also true for the spikes in 1948 and 1997). Luckily, this affects only three of our 13 
cohorts  of  interest.  Thus,  despite  this  caveat  in  the  data,  it  is  possible  to  identify  some  overall  patterns  of 
immigration.  7 
 
European  countries  (A10)  joined  in  a  further  enlarged  EU.
6  In  this  period  non-white 
immigration from Africa, Asia and the Middle East increased sharply, and immigration from 
Central and South America also became more pronounced.  
Finally,  Figure  7  shows  the  immigrant-native  real  earnings  gap  across  tax-years  by 
continent of nationality and is another way to see the earnings gap becoming more positive for 
North  Americans  during  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000s  and  more  negative  for  Eastern 
Europeans after 2000 (although it bounces back after 2004 when the minimum wage was 
increased, as shown in Figure 3 – also see the spike at the minimum wage level on the 2005 
earnings distribution in Figure 4). 
The above figures illustrate that disaggregation by continent of nationality and by cohort of 
arrival is another main advantage of the LLMDB. The LLMDB also permits disaggregation 
by small geographical levels.
7 This is in contrast with the more widely used Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) – which is a rotating panel survey that interviews around 60,000 households 
with  about  140,000  respondents  every  quarter  available  since  1992  (more  comprehensive 
wages and hours worked data is available after 1997) – where immigration analysis across 
years and continents or below the regional level is not feasible due to sample size limitations. 
Table 1 shows LFS variables. Dustmann and Fabbri (2005), using LFS data for a roughly 
comparable  sample  period,  report  descriptive  statistics  that  are  in  line  with  our  own 
descriptives here. 
Table 1 shows that both the LLMDB and the LFS exhibit broadly similar patterns (we use 
the 1997-2007 sample period for this comparison). Women are slightly underrepresented in 
the  LLMDB,  perhaps  reflecting  their  labour  market  participation  decisions.  The  age 
distribution in both datasets is remarkably similar for natives, though a larger proportion of 
immigrants is younger in the LLMDB (note that we tabulate observations, not individuals). 
This is because a larger share of observations in the LLMDB is for immigrants (8.2% versus 
7.7%) – and because the LLMDB better captures low paid immigrant workers, who tend to be 
younger.  For  example,  the  LLMDB  might  capture  working  foreign  students  and  working 
illegal  immigrants  who  might  not  have  been  captured  in  the  LFS.
8  As  a  result,  average 
                                            
6 Although the EU was successively enlarged at various points during our sample period, for consistency our 
definition of countries belonging to the EU throughout the whole period is that of 2006. We separately define the 
A10 countries, which are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
Malta and Cyprus. 
7  The  ONS-defined  geographical  areas  we  use  are:  409  Local  Authority  Districts,  49  counties  and  12 
Government Regions (ONS 2003) (see Table 1). 
8 A small number of workers who earn too little or work too few hours to incur a national insurance contribution 
liability,  for  example  those  working  part-time  for  very  small  employers,  are  not  included  in  the  LLMDB. 8 
 
earnings are lower in the LLMDB. 
Importantly, the LLMDB records annual earnings (within the tax-year) – i.e. total annual 
earnings  including  any  part-time  and/or  unemployment  spells  –  whereas  the  LFS  records 
weekly earnings in a given week, which are extrapolated for the year ignoring any part-time 
and/or unemployment spells (which are unknown). As a result, the LFS figures in Table 1 
overestimate earnings, which are higher for every percentile of the distribution. The difference 
is larger at the bottom and smaller at the top of the distribution, confirming that the LLMDB 
captures  more  low  paid  workers  (who  either  earn  lower  wages  or  work  fewer  hours).  In 
particular, the LFS figures overestimate earnings for immigrants, who are more likely to be 
low paid, and thus the gap between natives and immigrants is less (more) persistent in the LFS 
(LLMDB), with immigrants earning more than natives up to the 20
th (60
th) percentile of the 
distribution. However, although earnings are consistently lower in the LLMDB, the average 
earnings trend over time is similar. (Detailed comparisons across years, available on request, 
depict  a  very  similar  pattern  of  average  earnings,  percentile  earnings,  employment  and 
unemployment rates across both datasets.) Dickens and McKnight (2008) carried out a similar 
analysis comparing the LLMDB and the ASHE and also concluded that annual earnings are 
lower in the LLMDB but that the trend of average earnings, and of selected percentiles of the 
earnings distribution, across both datasets is similar over time. 
Finally, Table 1 shows that the regional distribution both in the LLMDB and in the LFS is 
remarkably  similar  for  natives  –  and  for  immigrants,  if  those  with  unknown  or  abroad 
locations are excluded from the analysis. The distribution of immigrants' country of origin is 
also very similar in both datasets – again if those from unknown origin are excluded from the 
analysis. The distribution of immigrants' cohort of arrival is also very similar in both datasets 
(for a discussion of the spike at the 1975-1979 cohort in the LLMDB, see Footnote 5). 
 
3. Model Specification 
Figures 2, 3 and 7 suggest that there is indeed an immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK 
between 1978 and 2006, which is quite sizeable for some groups of immigrants. However, 
such raw unconditional earnings gap estimates need to be proved robust when accounting for 
the effect of other individual characteristics (such as gender, age, continent of nationality, 
cohort of arrival, ability, motivation, etc.) on earnings. We now account for this by estimating 
                                                                                                                                        
Medium and larger employers are captured and their non-liable employees are included in the LLMDB. The LFS 
includes earnings for the self-employed, which are not recorded in the LLMDB (see above). 9 
 
the conditional immigrant-native earnings gap (conditional on such characteristics) using a 
standard  human  capital  earnings  model  (see  for  example,  Chiswick  1980,  Dustmann  and 
Fabbri  2005).  In  the  human  capital  model,  individuals'  earnings  are  a  function  of 
characteristics that influence individuals' productivity: 
iat t a i iat i iat f f f X I E ε λ β α + + + + + + =                   (1) 
where  iat E   is  log  real  earnings  of  individual  433069 ,..., 1 = i   in  area  49 ,..., 1 = a   and  time 
2006 ,..., 1978 = t ;  i I  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual is an immigrant; 
iat X  is a vector of observable individual characteristics;  i f  is individual fixed effects;  a f  is 
area fixed effects;  t f  is time fixed effects; and  iat ε  is the error term. The interpretation of our 
coefficient of interest is that immigrants on average earn  % β  more than natives.
9 
We model area fixed effects using county dummies (see Section 2). This way we remove 
any permanent differences across counties and make them equally attractive. In other words, 
we control for specific factors in a county (such as more schools, more housing, lower prices, 
etc.) that may make it more attractive to immigrants or natives or both. This enables us to 
separately account for the effect of county specific time invariant factors on earnings. We 
model time fixed effects using tax-year dummies (see Section 2). This way we control for the 
effect  of  tax-year  specific  macroeconomic  effects  (such  as  seasonal  shocks,  national  and 
international macroeconomic shocks, etc.) on earnings. This enables us to separately account 
for the effect of time specific factors on earnings. Controlling for area and time fixed effects 
in this flexible manner (across counties and tax-years) is an improvement to the existing UK 
earnings gap literature.
10  
We also control for observable individual characteristics such as sex, age, age squared 
number of employed weeks in the year and number of jobs in the year (see Table 1). This 
enables  us  to  separately  account  for  the  effect  of  such  characteristics  on  earnings.  For 
example, this way we account for earnings differentials due to workers being younger or less 
experienced in addition to being immigrants. Although we do not observe experience, we 
                                            
9 More precisely, immigrants on average earn  ] 1 ) [exp( 100 − = β b  more than natives. As most of our β  estimates 
are close to zero – in particular our preferred ones deriving from our most complete specifications (see Section 
4) –  β  is a good approximation of  b , so for simplicity we report  β  throughout the paper. Strictly speaking, 
immigrants on average earn β  more than natives in logarithmic units (Halvorsen and Palmquist 1980). 
10 The available models in this literature do not control for area fixed effects, except Dustman and Fabbri (2005), 
where region (not county) fixed effects are included. Here we model area fixed effects using 49 counties instead 
of 12 regions, which is a more flexible approach.  10 
 
control for age, which, albeit imperfectly, captures overall experience to a certain extent.
11,12 
We  control  for  unobservable  individual  characteristics  using  the  lagged  number  of 
employed weeks in the year and lagged real earnings (instead of using individual dummies). 
These  two  lagged  variables  together  embed  all  the  relevant  information  on  unobservable 
individual characteristics that affects earnings, such as motivation, race, immigrant's age at 
arrival, education (recall, as discussed in Section 2, that our sample is restricted to those aged 
25 to 64 who have already completed their education), etc.
13 This is because these two lagged 
variables capture individual specific time invariant characteristics that have the same impact 
on earnings year after year (Nakamura and Nakamura 1985; Chiswick et al. 2005). This way 
we also circumvent the problem of perfect collinearity between individual dummies necessary 
to model individual fixed effects  i f  and our variable of interest  i I . Finally, controlling for the 
lagged number of employed weeks in the year accounts for lower earnings for individuals 
with  historically  long  spells  of  unemployment.  Including  these  two  lagged  variables  also 
allows for the effect of dynamics in the model and alleviates problems arising from serial 
correlation in the residuals. 
Controlling for individual fixed effects enables us to separately account for the effect of 
                                            
11  Our  results  were  robust  to  including  extra  controls  such  as  receipt  of  maternity  benefit,  child  benefit, 
incapacity benefit, sickness benefit, etc. Most of these, however, are not consistently available for the entire 
sample period, since they were introduced or changed at various points in time.  
12 We also experimented with controlling for "age at entry" – which captures the human capital endowment at 
arrival and is particularly important for identifying immigrants who arrived as children and thus have the labour 
market characteristics of natives – but that did not alter our main results (also see Borjas 1994 and 1999). In our 
data sample, most immigrants arrived as adults; around 10% entered as children, and the vast majority of these 
arrived  before  1969  from  ex-colonies  and  from  Europe.  Lemos  (2011)  estimated  an  "immigrant  economic 
assimilation" model using the same data sample and controlling for "years since immigration", in an attempt to 
disentangle cohort and assimilation effects, and found results in line with ours. That model is conceptually 
different from ours because here we simply want to describe the existing immigrant-native earnings gap when 
comparing natives and immigrants as like for like. That is, we compare immigrants and natives with the same 
gender, age and employment level to see how differently they perform in the labour market, whatever their 
assimilation histories. In contrast, Lemos (2011) attempts to separately estimate assimilation effects. In addition, 
she allowed the effect of observable individual characteristics such as sex, age, number of employed weeks in 
the year and number of jobs in the year to differ between natives and immigrants. However, she restricted the 
effect of area and time fixed effects to be the same for immigrants and natives, as we also do here. This is a 
restrictive assumption, since macroeconomic conditions most likely affected both groups differently. This is 
particularly so if immigrants are concentrated in the low or high end of the earnings distribution and if the 
earnings distribution changed over time, as suggested by Table 1 and Figure 4 (see Section 2) (LaLonde and 
Topel 1992; Butcher and  DiNardo 2002). However, this is a common restriction in the literature (Borjas 1999). 
13 Although earnings models commonly control for education, there is an unresolved debate in the immigration 
literature  about  what  the  interpretation  of  other  coefficients  in  the  model  should  be  when  controlling  for 
education (Borjas 1999). Excluding education implies that we are comparing the earnings of immigrants and 
natives, and not the earnings of immigrants and natives with the same education level. This is important because, 
as we discuss in Section 4.1, the extent and quality of education varies across countries. Therefore, immigrants 
and natives with the same education may have different skills and compete for different jobs. Furthermore, 
immigrants across the education spectrum often suffer skill downgrading due to language or other labour market 
barriers (see Section 4.1).  11 
 
individual specific time invariant characteristics on earnings. This enables us to account for 
any earnings differential due, for example, to workers who are more motivated. Controlling 
for individual fixed effects using a sufficiently large and long longitudinal dataset such as the 
LLMDB  is  an  important  improvement  to  the  existing  UK  immigrant-native  earnings  gap 
literature.  This  is  because  controlling  for  individual  fixed  effects  ensures  that  sources  of 
selectivity  bias,  such  as  cohort  bias  or  survivor  bias,  are  accounted  for.  For  example,  by 
controlling for individual fixed effects we account for immigrants being more able, more 
motivated  or  hardworking  than  natives  as  well  as  for  changes  over  time  in  unmeasured 
dimensions of immigrants' skills and return migration (and for other types of data attrition). 
We use generalized least square estimation and correct for intragroup serial correlation, as 
standard errors are assumed to be independent across groups of individuals but not within 




The first column in bold of Table 2 shows a significant -0.132  β  estimate in our base 
model, whose predicted residuals are plotted in the top left panel of Figure 8. This estimate 
suggests that immigrants on average earn 13.2% less than natives. This base model accounts 
for area specific time invariant factors that may simultaneously affect both the earnings and 
the area choice of individuals, such as the fact that more multicultural or higher earnings areas 
(e.g. London) attract both immigrants and natives. In addition, this model also accounts for 
macroeconomic tax-year specific effects that may simultaneously affect both earnings and 
immigration decisions, such as interest rate changes or international shocks. As expected, this 
simple base model has a low R
2 (0.02). 
Further controlling for other individual characteristics yields a significant -0.023 estimate 
in  the  second  column  in  bold  of  Table  2  (also  see  top  right  panel  of  Figure  8)  and  a 
substantially higher R
2 (0.49). This estimate shows that the initial immigrant-natives earnings 
gap has considerably narrowed, suggesting that the earlier more negative gap was driven by 
omitted variables. This indicates that characteristics other than the immigration status (such as 
sex, age, number of employed weeks and number of jobs in the year, which, in the main are 
significant and of the expected sign here as well as in the remaining models in the paper) are 
important factors in explaining the immigrant-natives earnings gap in the UK, as expected.  
Finally,  when  controlling  for  unobservable  individual  characteristics  –  through  lagged 
number of employed weeks and lagged log real wages (see Sections 2 and 3) – the immigrant-12 
 
natives earnings gap estimate is a significant 0.023, as shown in the last column in bold of 
Table 2. This estimate suggests that immigrants earn 2.3% more than natives on average. This 
is our preferred model, as it separates out the effect of unobservable individual characteristics, 
which  were  being  unsatisfactorily  proxied  by  observable  individual  characteristics  in  the 
models above (particularly, perhaps, by the number of employed weeks and the number of 
jobs in the year). Its residuals are well behaved, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 8, and 
the associated R
2 is substantially higher (0.72).  
Our results suggest a small average immigrant-native earnings  gap in the UK between 
1978 and 2006. Our preferred estimate suggests that immigrants earn 2.3% more than natives 
on average. Put differently, immigrants do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty in the labour 
market as a result of their immigrant status. This suggests that the labour market primarily 
rewards observable and unobservable individual characteristics other than the immigration 
status. We explore these findings further using three different alternative and complementary 
estimation approaches in Sections 4.1 to 4.3. 
 
4.1  Across the Earnings Distribution 
Our models in Section 4 only estimate the average immigrant-natives earnings gap. The 
implicit approach was to compare the earnings of all immigrants with the earnings of all 
natives, which may not be realistic. This is because unskilled immigrants do not compete with 
skilled natives, for instance. So, an inflow of low paid unskilled immigrants will not directly 
affect earnings in the high paid highly skilled end of the labour market.  
We thus re-estimate Equation (1) for several percentiles across the earnings distribution 
using quantile regression estimation. This is to uncover potentially larger or smaller earnings 
gaps at particular points along the distribution that might have been masked by the average 
gap.
14 This is a particularly appealing approach where immigrants concentrate at the bottom 
and top of the earnings distribution, as it is the case for the UK over the sample period, where 
immigration has been of predominantly unskilled or highly skilled labour (see Section 2). 
Estimating the immigrant-native earnings gap in such a flexible manner across the earnings 
                                            
14 Several skill definitions have been used in the literature, e.g. occupation, education, education-experience, 
percentiles of the earnings or wage distribution, etc. (see for example Card 2001; Borjas 2003). Using percentiles 
of the earnings distribution is a more accurate measure than perhaps education or experience. Firstly, the extent 
and quality of education varies across countries. Therefore, immigrants and natives in the same education cell 
may have different skills and compete for different jobs. Secondly, earnings measure the effective reward that 
immigrants obtain, after usual skill downgrading due to language or other labour market barriers. Thirdly, there 
is evidence that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes within education groups in the UK (Manacorda 
et al. 2006). 13 
 
distribution  is  an  improvement  to  the  existing  UK  earnings  gap  literature,  where  only 
estimates of the average gap are available. 
Figure 9 shows significant immigrant-native earnings gap estimates for our base model and 
for our preferred model (also see Table A1 in the appendix). As before, the gap substantially 
narrows  in  our  most  complete  and  preferred  specification.  It  also  becomes  non-negative, 
except below the 30
th percentile.  Interestingly, the gap increases monotonically across the 






th percentiles. This suggests that the more skilled immigrants are, the more favourable 
the earnings gap they experience; and the less skilled immigrants are, the larger the earnings 
penalty they suffer. For example, among the 10% best paid workers, immigrants earn 8.7% 
more than natives; whereas among the 10% worst paid workers, immigrants earn 3% less than 
natives.  This  compares  with  our  earlier  average  gap  estimate  of  2.3%  (compare  the  last 
column in bold of Tables 2 and A1). 
Thus, our conclusion is that the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1978 
and  2006  varies  substantially  across  the  distribution,  increasing  monotonically,  and  this 
variability is masked when solely the average gap is considered. While the gap was zero at the 
30
th percentile, it was negative at the bottom of the distribution (-7.4% at the 5
th percentile), 
and positive above the median (between 2.4% and 8.7%). Given that immigration to the UK 
has  been  of  predominantly  unskilled  or  highly  skilled  labour  (see  Section  2),  we  indeed 
expected larger gaps at the bottom and top of the distribution. 
In sum, on the one hand, the lowest paid immigrants suffer an earnings penalty in relation 
to the lowest paid natives with comparable individual characteristics. On the other hand, other 
immigrants do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty in the labour market as a result of their 
immigrant status – the gap is fairly small in the lower middle of the distribution and it is in 
favour of higher paid immigrants. In line with our conclusion from before, this suggests that, 
except  for  the  lowest  and  highest  paid  immigrants,  the  labour  market  primarily  rewards 
observable and unobservable individual characteristics other than the immigration status.  
According to standard human capital theory, non-negligible gap estimates could be due to 
unaccounted  productivity  differentials.  However,  our  model  is  quiet  comprehensive.  For 
example, our model seems to have captured most such productivity differentials in the lower 
middle of the distribution, where the gap was fairly small. In the absence of such supply side 
productivity differentials, possible demand side explanations are that the relatively large gaps 
at the bottom and top of the distribution are due to imperfect information or discrimination. 14 
 
Although no estimates of the immigrant-natives earnings gap across the distribution for the 
UK  are  available  to  compare  our  estimates  with,  our  results  are  in  line  with  the  limited 
international literature, which shows that the immigrant-native gap is also more favourable 
higher up the distribution for the US (Butcher and  DiNardo 2002; Chiswick et al. 2008).  
 
4.2  By Continent of Nationality 
Although estimates across the earnings distribution are much more informative than our 
earlier  average  estimates,  they  still  pool  together  very  diverse  groups  of  immigrants  who 
differ widely in several individual characteristics (such as English proficiency, work ethics, 
skills  (formal  education)  transferability,  etc.)  and  might  not  always  be  perfect  labour 
substitutes. Although we implicitly account for these individual characteristics that are not 
observed in our dataset when we control for unobservable individual characteristics, we now 
re-estimate Equation (1) including an explicit indicator for continent of nationality as a proxy 
for such "group" individual characteristics. Producing estimates by continent of nationality is, 
of course, informative in itself, as recognized in the existing UK and international literature 
(Chiswick  1980;  Borjas  1994;  Butcher  and  DiNardo  2002;  Dustmann  and  Fabbri  2005; 
Dickens and McKnight 2008). It is also a way to gain a further insight into the immigrant-
native earnings gap from a different angle. This is because, as discussed in Section 2, the 
various immigration waves to the UK between 1978 and 2006 happened in such a manner that 
it  is  possible  that  immigrants  from  particular  nationalities  broadly  cluster  in  different 
segments of the earnings distribution. We check this by contrasting our new estimates across 
continents  of  nationalities  with  our  earlier  estimates  across  the  earnings  distribution. 
Estimating the earnings gap in such a flexible manner across continents of nationality is a 
contribution to the existing UK earnings gap literature, where only estimates by race and 
ethnicity are available. 
Figure 10 shows immigrant-native earnings gap estimates for our base model (left panel) 
and for our preferred model (right panel) (also see Table A2 in the appendix). As before, the 
gap substantially narrows in our most complete and preferred specification. It also becomes 
positive  and  remains  significant  for  most  nationalities,  though  it  is  insignificant  for 
immigrants from Africa, Asia and the Middle East and Central and South America. The gap is 
2.9%  for  EU  immigrants,  4.6%  for  immigrants  from  Australia  and  Oceania,  5.6%  for 
immigrants  from  Europe,  7.9%  for  immigrants  from  the  A10  countries  and  10.7%  for 
immigrants from North America. This compares with our earlier average gap estimate of 2.3% 15 
 
(compare the last column in bold of Tables 2 and A2). 
 In keeping with the  existing UK literature (Chiswick 1980; Bell 1997; Dustmann and 
Fabbri 2005), our base model estimates suggest a clear and wide dividing line between whites 
and non-whites (see left panel of Figure 10). However, our preferred model estimates, where 
we control for observable as well as unobservable individual characteristics, suggest that the 
gap for non-whites is 0%, whereas it is between 2.9% and 10.7% for whites (see right panel of 
Figure  10).  This  suggests  a  much  narrower  and  subtler  dividing  line,  confirming  the 
importance of accounting for observable as well as unobservable individual characteristics. It 
also suggests  yet again that the labour market primarily rewards individual characteristics 
other than immigrant status.  
We  can  compare  continent  of  nationality  estimates  with  estimates  across  the  earnings 
distribution. For example, non-white immigrants (gap of 0%) are overrepresented below the 
median of the distribution (gap between -7.4% and 0.7%). In contrast, white immigrants (gap 
between 2.9% and 10.7%) are overrepresented in the top quantile of the distribution (gap 
between 3.7% and 8.7%). This suggests that nationalities tend to cluster in segments of the 
distribution, in line with our descriptive analysis in Section 2 (see Figures 3 and 7). 
 Thus, our conclusion is that the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1978 
and 2006 varies across continents of nationality. Unlike previous research, we found a 0% gap 
for non-whites when estimating our most complete and preferred specifications. The existing 
UK literature (Chiswick 1980; Bell 1997; Dustmann and Fabbri 2005) reports earnings gap 
estimates between -40% and -10% for non-whites when estimating models that are closer in 
nature to our less complete specifications, which produced comparable estimates magnitudes 
(between -22% and -16.5%). We also found a positive gap for whites that was smaller than in 
previous research (between 2.9% and 10.7%).  
In sum, non-whites do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty in the labour market as a 
result of their immigrant status. In contrast, whites experience a favourable gap. We thus 
maintain  our  main  conclusion  from  before,  that  the  labour  market  primarily  rewards 
observable  and  unobservable  individual  characteristics  other  than  the  immigration  status. 
Again,  explanations  for  this  gap  could  be  either  supply  side  productivity  differentials  or 
demand side imperfect information and/or discrimination by employers (see Section 4.1). 
 
4.3  By Cohort of Arrival 
Allowing  our  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  estimate  to  vary  across  the  earnings 16 
 
distribution  and  across  continents  of  nationality  in  Sections  4.1  and  4.2  consists  in  two 
different identification strategies which allowed an interesting comparison. Another way to re-
estimate our Equation (1) is to allow for estimates to vary across cohorts of arrival. Producing 
estimates by cohort of arrival is, of course, informative in itself, as widely recognized in the 
literature (Borjas 1985 and 1999; Bell 1997). It is also a way to gain a further insight into the 
immigrant-native earnings gap here from a third different angle. This is because the nature of 
the immigration phenomenon to the UK between 1978 and 2006 is such that a comparison 
between earnings gap estimates across continents of nationality and across cohorts of arrival is 
particularly appealing. As discussed in Section 2, the various immigration waves to the UK 
between 1978 and 2006 happened in such a manner that it is possible to associate immigrants 
from particular nationalities with particular cohorts. 
If all cohorts had the same mix of immigrants in terms of continent of nationality, skills, 
motivation,  work  ethics,  etc.,  and  if  the  economic  conditions  in  the  UK  were  the  same 
throughout the whole sample period (along with natives' attitudes to migration), then there 
would be no reason to expect earnings gap estimates to vary across cohorts of arrival. We 
largely account for local and national macroeconomic conditions in the UK affecting earnings 
when we control for county and tax-year fixed effects. However, it is still possible that the 
earnings gap estimates are affected by immigrants' characteristics specific to their cohort of 
arrival. Thus, we now re-estimate Equation (1) including an explicit indicator for 13 five-year 
cohorts of arrival as a proxy for such "cohort" individual characteristics. This way we account 
for characteristics that vary across cohorts such as unmeasured dimensions of immigrants' 
skills or return migration of immigrants that are more or less able. We also account for the 
nationality  composition  of  the  cohort.  This  is  because  most  cohorts  display  a  mix  of 
nationalities, and thus a very diverse group of immigrants is pooled together in each cohort. 
However, in most cohorts there are one or two relatively dominant nationalities. Because of 
this, we can loosely compare the estimates by cohort of arrival (by pinpointing the dominant 
continent  of  nationality  in  that  cohort)  with  the  estimates  by  continent  of  nationality. 
Estimating  the  earnings  gap  in  such  a  flexible  manner  across  13  cohorts  of  arrival  is  a 
contribution  to  the  existing  UK  earnings  gap  literature,  where  such  estimates  are  yet 
unavailable. 
Figure 11 shows immigrant-native earnings gap estimates for our base model (left panel) 
and for our preferred model (right panel) (also see Table A3 in the appendix). As before, the 
gap  substantially  narrows  in  our  most  complete  and  preferred  specification,  when  it  is 17 
 
between -1.7% and 8.6%. It is positive and remains significant for all cohorts, except for 
1990-1994, when it is a significant -0.017, and for 1985-1989 and 1945-1949, when it is 
insignificantly different from zero. This compares with our earlier average gap estimate of 
2.3% (compare the last column in bold Tables 2 and A3). 
Between 1945 and 1965 the gap is between 0% and 2.6%. These cohorts were dominated 
by the arrival of white (mainly from Ireland) and non-white (mainly from former colonies) 
immigrants who came to help with the post-war reconstruction effort. The gap surprisingly 
jumps to 5.5% and 3.9% for 1965-1969 and 1970-1974 respectively, before coming down 
again. This should be viewed with caution. As discussed in Section 2, with the new computer 
system introduced in 1975, data for immigrants who arrived in the immediately preceding 
years was inputted with a significant delay. Thus the estimates for 1970-1974 (the same is the 
case for 1945-1948), and to a lesser extent for 1965-1969, might be based on a biased sample, 
where perhaps whites are incorrectly overrepresented. For example, non-white immigration of 
Indians peaked between 1965 and 1972, in part because of Gujarati Indians expelled from 
Uganda, though this does not seem to be accurately recorded in our data (see Figure 6).  
Between  1975  and  1984  the  gap  is  between  0.9%  and  1.2%.  These  cohorts  saw 
proportionately large white immigration, following the decision of the UK to join the EU – 
although the earlier part of this period coincides with greater refugee immigration from India, 
Vietnam and South East Asia.  
Between 1985 and 1994 the gap is smallest. It is insignificant for 1985-1989 and it is -1.7% 
for  1990-1994.  These  are  cohorts  where  immigration  of  both  whites  and  non-whites 
accelerated. Following the enlargement of the EU in the mid 1980s when Greece, Portugal 
and Spain joined in, there was greater immigration of lower paid EU whites (also see Figure 
7). There was also a modest increase of relatively low paid white immigrants from Australia 
and Oceania. In addition, there was greater immigration of lower paid non-whites from Africa 
and Asia and the Middle East.  
Between 1995 and 2004 the gap is largest, between 3.7% and 8.6%. These are cohorts 
when  the  immigration  of  both  whites  and  non-whites  accelerated  steeply.  White  EU 
immigration  increased  sharply,  now  including  higher  paid  workers  (for  example  from 
Germany and France) alongside workers from Portugal and Spain as well as from Eastern 
European countries following further enlargement of the EU. White immigration of higher 
paid workers from North America and from Australasia and Oceania also contributed to a 
larger gap in favour of immigrants. In contrast, non-white immigration of lower paid workers 18 
 
also increased, for example from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and more modestly from 
Central and South America.
15   
An attempt to compare cohort of arrival estimates with continent of nationality estimates 
suggests that, broadly speaking, cohorts with proportionately larger white immigration have a 
larger positive gap in favour of immigrants. For example, the earnings gap is between -1.7% 
and  0%  for  the  1985-1994  cohorts,  when  there  was  proportionately  large  non-white 
immigration (although this period also coincides with greater lower paid white immigration 
following the enlargement of the EU in the mid 1980s when Greece, Portugal and Spain 
joined  in).  This  contrasts  with  an  earnings  gap  between  3.7%  to  8.6%  following 
proportionately  large  white  immigration  in  the  1995-2004  cohorts,  when  EU  immigration 
increased along with increased immigration from North America, Australasia and Oceania 
(although this period also witnessed greater non-white immigration from Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East).  
These are, however, at  best tentative conclusions, since most cohorts display a mix of 
white and non-white immigration. The analysis is further confounded when we differentiate 
between lower paid and higher paid white immigration, which might also affect the direction 
and magnitude of the gap. Nonetheless, this is a worthwhile exercise for very broad patterns. 
For  example,  it  is  relatively  safe  to  contrast  the  -1.7%  to  0%  gap  during  the  1985-1994 
cohorts, which was dominated by non-whites together with lower paid whites, with the 3.7% 
to  8.6%  gap  during  the  1995-2004  cohorts,  when  the  proportion  of  higher  paid  whites 
increased. This is in line with our earnings gap estimates for non-whites (0%) and for whites 
(2.9% to 10.7%) in Section 4.2 and with our descriptive statistics in Section 2 (see Figures 6 
and 7).  
In sum, our conclusion is that the immigrant-native earnings gap in the UK between 1978 
and  2006  varies  across  cohorts  of  arrival.  We  found  small  (positive  and  negative)  gaps 
clustered around zero for cohorts that witnessed proportionately larger non-white and lower 
paid white immigration. Thus, non-whites might sometimes suffer a small earnings penalty in 
the  labour  market  as  a  result  of  their  immigrants'  status.  In  contrast,  we  found  a  more 
favourable  gap for cohorts that experienced proportionately larger  white immigration. We 
thus  maintain  our  main  conclusion  from  before,  that  this  suggests  that  the  labour  market 
                                            
15 For the single-year-cohort 2005, the gap estimate is an unreasonable 0.440. This is probably due to the fact 
that this cohort is four years shorter, so it constitutes a smaller sample than the other five-years cohort, for which 
furthermore, there is only one usable observation for each individual (since the observation from the year before 
is used up when calculating lagged earnings). Therefore, estimates for this cohort should be treated with caution. 
For example, the estimate swings wildly across columns in Table A3 (going from -0.765 to 0.440).  19 
 
primarily rewards observable and unobservable individual characteristics other than simply 
the  immigration  status.  Again,  explanations  for  this  gap  could  be  either  supply  side 
productivity  differentials  or  demand  side  imperfect  information  and/or  discrimination  by 
employers (see Section 4.1). 
The earnings gap did not increase monotonically over time. Some of the post-war cohorts 
do as well, and sometimes better, than more recent cohorts (1945-1959 versus 1985-1994). In 
contrast, some more recent cohorts, only a few years apart, register gaps which are relatively 
far apart (1990-1994 and 1995-1999 respectively). This suggests that return migration of more 
or less able immigrants might not be very severe, because if the least able were more likely to 
return to their country of origin, earlier cohorts would have more favourable earnings gaps 
than more recent ones. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify an overall trend of more positive 
gaps over time if we ignore the 1975-1995 cohorts.  
Even  though  no  directly  comparable  estimates  of  the  immigrant-natives  earnings  gap 
across  cohorts  of  arrival  are  available  for  the  UK  (Bell  1997  offers  cohort  estimates  by 
ethnicity  using  a  different  model  specification),  our  results  are  broadly  in  line  with  the 
international literature – although Borjas (1999), using a different model specification and US 
data, shows that cohort effects increase monotonically over time. 
 
4.4  By Gender 
We now re-estimate Equation (1) separately for males and females, in turn. This is a final 
way to gain further insight into the immigrant-native earnings gap here. Moreover, although 
most  of  the  UK  and  international  literature  concentrates  on  estimates  for  male  workers, 
producing estimates for female workers is informative in itself and is an important area for 
research (Dustmann and Fabbri 2005; Chiswick and Adsera 2007). One important distinction 
is the different mobility behaviour of male and female immigrants, both into and across the 
host  country,  as  well  as  of  male  and  female  natives  across  the  country  in  response  to 
immigration flows. Another important distinction is the different labour market participation 
decisions made by men and women, both immigrants and natives, as well as the different 
employers' decisions in relation to these groups. For example, employers may substitute away 
from native mothers with small children and towards male immigrants. Also, entry into some 
occupations  in  which  women  are  overrepresented  might  be  easier  for  immigrants,  as  for 
instance  those  that  accommodate  low  paid  or  part-time  work.  For  example,  some  of  the 
available evidence in the literature suggests that the minimum wage plays a role in shaping the 20 
 
earnings distribution for women (Butcher and DiNardo 2002). Our own descriptive evidence 
in Section 2 also suggests that the unconditional earnings gap is different for men and women 
(see Figure 2). Thus, estimating the earnings gap by gender is a contribution to the existing 
UK earnings gap literature, where estimates for female workers are scarcely available. 
Figure 12 shows immigrant-native earnings gap estimates for our preferred model across 
the earnings distribution for male and female workers (also see Table A4 in the appendix). 
The earnings gap is between -7.9% and 10.3%, in line with the results for the pooled sample 
(see Section 4.1). As before, the gap is non-negative above the 20
th (30
th) percentile of the 
distribution for male (female) and it again increases monotonically across the distribution. It is 
respectively -0.031, 0.018 and 0.103 for the 10
th, 50
th and 90
th percentiles for males, and          
-0.022, 0.010, and 0.066 for females. This compares with an average estimate of 0.024 and 
0.026 for males and females (see Table A5 in the appendix). Thus, although the average gap is 
fairly  close  for  males  and  females,  it  masks  different  patterns  across  the  distribution:  the 
estimates are fairly close for males and females in the lower middle of the distribution (20
th to 
50
th percentiles) although they are more negative at the bottom and more positive at the top of 
the  distribution  for  males.  This  suggests  that  male  immigrants  are  at  disadvantage  at  the 
bottom and at advantage at the top of the distribution in relation to female immigrants, for 
whom the gap is less variable throughout the distribution. 
Figure 13 shows immigrant-native earnings gap estimates for our preferred model across 
continents of nationality (left panel) and cohort of arrival (right panel) for male and female 
workers (compare Table A5 with the last column in bold of Tables 2, A2 and A3 in the 
appendix). Across continents of nationality, the earnings gap is between 0% and 11.8%, in 
line with the results for the pooled sample (see Section 4.2). They follow the same pattern, 
although the estimates for females are now more often significant. As before, the gap is 0% 
for  non-white  males  and  females  (except  for  1.2%  for  Asia  and  the  Middle  East  female 
immigrants) and between 2.8% and 11.8% for whites. The gap is again more positive for 
some male immigrants (from North America and A10) but fairly close, in the main, between 
males and females.  
Across cohorts of arrival, the earnings gap is between -2.8% and 11%, in line with the 
results for the pooled sample (see Section 4.3). They follow the same pattern, although the 
estimates  for  males  (females)  are  now  more  (less)  often  significant.  As  before,  broadly 
speaking, cohorts with proportionately larger white immigration have a larger positive gap in 
favour or immigrants. For example, the earnings gap is between -2.8% and 0% for the 1985-21 
 
1994  cohorts,  when  there  was  proportionately  large  non-white  immigration,  and  between 
1.7% and 11% for the 1995-2004 when there was proportionately large white immigration 
(see Section 4.3). 
In sum, our main conclusions from before are maintained. The immigrant-native earnings 
gap in the UK between 1978 and 2006 for male and female workers varies across the earnings 
distribution, across continents of nationality and across cohorts of arrival. This is in line with 
the limited UK evidence, which also shows that the immigrant-native gap varies across gender 
(Dustmann and Fabbri 2005). 
 
5. Discussion 
Our  results  suggest  that  there  is  indeed  an  immigrant-native  earnings  gap  in  the  UK 
between 1978 and 2006. We initially found that immigrants earn 2.3% more than natives on 
average.  However,  this  gap  varied  substantially  across  the  distribution,  increasing 
monotonically, and this variability was masked when solely the average gap was considered. 
While the gap was zero at the 30
th percentile, it was between -7.4% and 0.7% below the 
median, and between 2.4% and 8.7% above the median. We also found a gap for non-white 
immigrants,  who  are  overrepresented  below  the  median,  of  0%;  and  a  gap  for  white 
immigrants, who are overrepresented in the top quantile of the distribution, between 2.9% and 
10.7%. This suggests that immigrants from certain nationalities tend to cluster in segments of 
the  distribution.  Finally,  we  found  less  favourable  gaps  for  cohorts  that  witnessed 
proportionately larger non-white and lower paid white immigration (e.g. between -1.7% and 
0%  in  1985-1994)  and  more  favourable  gaps  for  cohorts  experiencing  larger  white 
immigration (e.g. between 3.7% and 8.6% in 1995-2004). 
Thus, on the one hand, the lowest paid immigrants, whom are disproportionately  non-
white,  suffer  an  earnings  penalty  in  relation  to  the  lowest  paid  natives  with  comparable 
individual characteristics. On the other hand, other immigrants do not seem to suffer a penalty 
– the gap was fairly small in the lower middle of the distribution and it was in favour of higher 
paid immigrants, whom are disproportionately white.  
Our main conclusion deriving from these findings is that most immigrants do not seem to 
suffer an earnings penalty in the labour market. This suggests that, except for the lowest and 
highest paid immigrants, the labour market primarily rewards observable and unobservable 
individual characteristics other than the immigration status. 
Our main conclusion stems from the estimates in our more complete models. When we 22 
 
estimated the earnings gap using simple models, comparable to those in the limited existing 
UK literature, we found comparable results that confirmed the previously documented clear 
and wide dividing line between whites and non-whites. However, when we estimated the 
earnings gap using more complete models, where we control not only for observable, as it is 
common in the literature, but also for unobservable individual characteristics, we found a 
much narrower and subtler dividing line than that in the existing UK literature. This confirms 
the  importance  of  accounting  for  observable  as  well  as  unobservable  individual 
characteristics, which is an important contribution of this paper. And this is what drives our 
main conclusion that the labour market primarily rewards individual characteristics other than 
immigration status. 
Our estimates are in line with our earlier descriptive analysis and are robust to a number of 
specification checks as well as to different stratifications of the labour market and to different 
sub-samples of workers. Although our main conclusion is that most immigrants do not seem 
to  suffer  a  largely  favourable  or  unfavourable  earnings  gap,  our  results  confirm  that, 
especially at the bottom and top of the earnings distribution, there is indeed an immigrant-
native earnings gap in the UK between 1978 and 2006. According to standard human capital 
theory, non-negligible immigrant-native earnings gap estimates could be due to supply side 
productivity differentials between natives and immigrants, perhaps unaccounted for in our 
model. This could be due to imperfect transferability of immigrants' country-specific human 
capital or immigrants' skill downgrading due to language or other labour market barriers. For 
example, employers attach a different weight to experience gained prior to immigration. Even 
in  the  absence  of  such  supply  side  productivity  differentials,  there  could  be  demand  side 
explanations for non-negligible earnings gap, such as imperfect information or discrimination 
in the labour market. These considerations point towards fruitful areas for future research 
which inherently raise a wealth of policy implications. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Exploiting  a  sizeable  and  long  longitudinal  dataset  we  estimated  the  immigrant-native 
earnings gap across the entire earnings distribution, across continents of nationality and across 
cohorts of arrival in the UK between 1978 and 2006.  
In keeping with the limited existing UK literature, we found a clear and wide dividing line 
between whites and non-whites when we estimated the earnings gap using simple comparable 
models. However, when we estimated the earnings gap using more complete models, where 23 
 
we control not only for observable, as it is common in the literature, but also for unobservable 
individual characteristics, which is an important contribution of this paper, we found a much 
narrower and subtler dividing line than that in the existing UK literature: a gap of 0% for non-
whites  and  a  gap  between  2.9%  and  10.7%  for  whites.  This  confirms  the  importance  of 
accounting for observable as well as unobservable individual characteristics. It also suggests 
that the labour market  primarily  rewards individual characteristics other than immigration 
status. 
When we estimated the gap across the earnings distribution, we found that it was between     
-7.4% and 0.7% below the median, where non-white immigrants are overrepresented, and 
between 2.4% and 8.7% above the median, where white immigrants are overrepresented. This 
suggests that most immigrants do not seem to suffer an earnings penalty in the labour market 
as a result of their immigrants' status. Finally, we found less favourable gaps for cohorts that 
witnessed proportionately larger non-white and lower paid white immigration. 
This  new  evidence  is  an  important  contribution  to  the  very  limited  UK  immigration 
literature  –  in  particular,  it  helps  to  fill  a  blank  in  the  literature  on  the  immigrant-native 
earnings  gap  in  the  UK.  This  new  evidence  is  also  an  important  contribution  to  the 
international  immigration  literature  because  it  applies  a  thorough  empirical  estimation 
approach  to  an  underexplored,  long  and  sizeable  longitudinal  dataset  to  carefully  study  a 
crucial labour market issue: the immigrant-native earnings gap, which is an objective measure 
of how immigrants fare in the labour market. We exploit the longitudinal nature of our dataset 
to  separate  the  effect  of  individual  unobserved  characteristics  from  the  effect  of  other 
individual observed characteristics on earnings – which in turn helps prevent biases implied 
by various types of selectivity in the data, such as cohort bias and survivor bias. Given that 
such biases constitute an identification issue that has occupied much of the literature for the 
last 30 years, and given that this literature has long recognized that the ideal solution for this 
is to use sufficiently large and long longitudinal data – always very scarce – this paper is a 
timely contribution. 
This new evidence is, most crucially, an important and timely contribution to informing 
policymaking in the face of continuing and heated public debate on immigration policy in the 
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Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                                                            
VARIABLES LLMDB LLMDB LFS
April 1978 - Marc h 2007 April 1997 - Marc h 2007 January 1997 - Marc h 2007
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
I - P OP ULATION VARIAB LES
% aged:
25 to 34 years old 31.34% 43.83% 29.47% 43.24% 29.06% 36.59%
35 to 64 years old 68.66% 56.17% 70.53% 56.76% 70.94% 63.41%
% of women 43.43% 44.85% 46.67% 44.37% 48.47% 47.51%
% from:
EU (except A1 0) - 32.20% - 30.99% - 25.66%
A10 - 4.03% - 5.41% - 5.43%
Europe (except EU) - 3.15% - 3.64% - 2.65%
Asia and Middle East - 20.89% - 22.38% - 27.94%
North America - 6.09% - 5.04% - 4.63%
Latin America - 3.24% - 3.49% - 6.59%
Africa - 13.80% - 16.16% - 21.39%
Australasia and Oceania - 7.30% - 6.39% - 4.74%
Unknown - 9.31% - 6.51% - na
Average age at arrival - 23.03 - 24.43 - na
Average nb of years since immigration - 14.73 - 13.30 - na
% with lenght of immigration
0 to 1 years - 8.64% - 11.15% - na
2 to 3 years - 10.17% - 12.54% - na
4 to 5 years - 8.48% - 9.73% - na
6 to 10 years - 16.96% - 17.06% - na
1 1 to 15 years - 15.24% - 14.02% - na
1 6 to 20 years - 11.70% - 10.46% - na
over 20 years - 28.82% - 25.04% - na
% arrived during:
1 945-1 949   - 3.87% - 0.04% - 1.03%
1 950-1 954   - 2.63% - 0.46% - 1.77%
1 955-1 959   - 4.54% - 1.69% - 3.45%
1 960-1 964   - 5.79% - 2.84% - 7.23%
1 965-1 969   - 6.05% - 3.38% - 8.57%
1 970-1 974   - 4.38% - 2.79% - 9.16%
1 975-1 979   - 17.45% - 11.77% - 7.61%
1 980-1 984   - 9.62% - 8.48% - 5.57%
1 985-1 989   - 12.72% - 13.47% - 7.69%
1 990-1 994   - 10.54% - 14.22% - 9.10%
1 995-1 999   - 10.59% - 18.95% - 13.49%
2000-2004   - 10.76% - 19.92% - 13.26%
2005 - 1.08% - 1.99% - 1.39%
% located in:
East Midlands 7.64% 4.26% 7.68% 4.28% 7.66% 4.79%
East of England 9.50% 7.28% 9.55% 7.62% 9.69% 9.12%
London 8.73% 29.87% 9.03% 35.14% 9.61% 41.76%
North East 4.46% 2.08% 4.35% 1.88% 4.32% 1.31%
North West 11.72% 5.54% 11.56% 5.57% 11.97% 5.57%
Northern Ireland 2.39% 1.26% 2.51% 1.29% 2.51% 1.22%
Scotland 9.43% 5.16% 9.39% 4.78% 9.03% 3.67%
South East 13.73% 12.37% 13.93% 12.87% 13.99% 13.87%
South West 8.79% 5.25% 8.76% 5.09% 8.51% 5.24%
Wales 4.87% 2.17% 4.79% 1.95% 4.87% 1.80%
West Midlands 9.16% 5.10% 9.10% 5.26% 9.20% 6.90%
Yorkshire and the Humber 8.68% 4.12% 8.66% 4.13% 8.66% 4.74%














Table 1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (continued)                                                 
VARIABLES LLMDB LLMDB LFS
April 1978 - Marc h 2007 April 1997 - Marc h 2007 January 1997 - Marc h 2007
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
II - LAB OUR MARKET VARIAB LES
% in work: 
1  to 25 weeks in the year 16.74% 26.05% 18.84% 30.33% na  na
26 to 50 weeks in the year 13.93% 18.96% 15.45% 20.95% na na
51  to 52 weeks in the year 69.09% 54.76% 65.55% 48.54% na na
Average number of employed weeks in the year 43.18 38.52 42.10 36.40 na na
Average number of unemployed weeks  1.37 1.39 1.03 1.17 na na
Average number of jobs in the year  1.33 1.53 1.44 1.66 na na
5th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 7.60 7.27 7.65 7.25 9.22 9.15
10th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 8.26 7.97 8.35 7.99 9.39 9.34
20th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 8.87 8.65 8.93 8.68 9.59 9.57
30th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.26 9.09 9.30 9.12 9.73 9.74
40th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.50 9.40 9.55 9.43 9.86 9.88
50th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.68 9.64 9.74 9.68 9.99 10.03
60th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.84 9.86 9.91 9.90 10.12 10.17
70th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 9.99 10.06 10.08 10.13 10.26 10.32
80th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 10.16 10.29 10.27 10.37 10.42 10.51
90th percentile of the log real earnings distribution 10.41 10.62 10.52 10.74 10.65 10.80
Average of the log real earnings distribution 9.48 9.45 9.55 9.50 10.00 10.04
Standard deviation of the log real earnings distribution 0.95 1.13 0.99 1.18 0.53 0.61
Number of observations 5053659 319427 1935699 172466 507606 42230
Number of individuals 387760 45309 277532 35415 na na
Average number of times an individual is observed 15.76 18.71 24.53 25.16 na na
% observations per year:
1978 2.89% 1.69% - - - -
1979 3.16% 2.02% - - - -
1980 3.07% 1.97% - - - -
1981 3.09% 1.96% - - - -
1982 3.08% 1.95% - - - -
1983 3.07% 1.95% - - - -
1984 3.14% 2.05% - - - -
1985 3.08% 2.03% - - - -
1986 3.11% 2.08% - - - -
1987 3.11% 2.14% - - - -
1988 3.26% 2.35% - - - -
1989 3.34% 2.52% - - - -
1990 3.42% 2.67% - - - -
1991 3.38% 2.74% - - - -
1992 3.42% 2.90% - - - -
1993 3.44% 3.02% - - - -
1994 3.50% 3.19% - - - -
1995 3.56% 3.32% - - - -
1996 3.56% 3.45% - - - -
1997 3.68% 3.67% 9.62% 6.80% 10.51% 9.23%
1998 3.73% 3.91% 9.75% 7.24% 11.55% 10.50%
1999 3.81% 4.30% 9.95% 7.96% 11.11% 10.15%
2000 3.86% 4.69% 10.08% 8.69% 10.56% 9.27%
2001 3.88% 5.00% 10.13% 9.26% 7.72% 7.30%
2002 3.88% 5.41% 10.13% 10.01% 10.14% 10.27%
2003 3.90% 5.91% 10.18% 10.94% 9.73% 9.86%
2004 3.83% 6.52% 9.99% 12.08% 9.23% 9.54%
2005 3.90% 7.43% 10.17% 13.75% 8.87% 10.23%
2006 3.83% 7.16% 10.00% 13.26% 8.44% 10.79%
Average number of observations per year 174264 11015 193570 17247 50761 4223
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database and Labour Force Survey.
(1) Sample includes those aged 25 to 64 employed and earning between £100 and £1000000 in the year. 
(2) LFS figures are courtesy of the DWP.  27 
 
Table 2 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap 
Variable coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
Intercept 9.647 0.009 6.052 0.013 1.728 0.008
Immigrant (=1) -0.132 0.006 -0.023 0.004 0.023 0.002
Sex (male=1) 0.595 0.002 0.175 0.001
Age 0.048 0.000 0.020 0.000
Age squared  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.040 0.000 0.023 0.000
Number of jobs  0.347 0.003 0.202 0.002
Lagged number of employed weeks -0.005 0.000
Lagged log real earnings 0.668 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.49 0.72
Sample size 5373086 5366162 4893023
Number of individuals 433069 433069 433069
(1) The sample data used includes those aged 25 to 64 earning between £100 and £1000000 in any one tax year who are observed at least twice 
     (it excludes the self-employed). It includes immigrants arriving from 1945 onwards. See text for details.
(2) All models include area fixed effects (49 county dummies) and time fixed effects (29 tax-year dummies). Only the the model in the right-most 
     column controls for individual fixed effects via lagged log real earnings and lagged number of employed weeks. See text for details.
(3) All models are corrected for intragroup correlation, as standard errors are assumed independent across groups of individuals but not within 




















Table A1 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap Across the Earnings Distribution
Variable coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Percentile 5th 10th 20th 30th 40th
Intercept 8.133 0.018 8.637 0.011 9.217 0.008 9.511 0.006 9.671 0.004
Immigrant (=1) -0.393 0.008 -0.372 0.005 -0.318 0.004 -0.274 0.003 -0.203 0.002
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sample size 5373086 5373086 5373086 5373086 5373086
Number of Individuals 433069 433069 433069 433069 433069
Intercept -1.613 0.007 -1.222 0.004 -0.673 0.002 -0.208 0.002 0.192 0.002
Immigrant (=1) -0.074 0.001 -0.030 0.001 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000
Sex (male=1) 0.097 0.001 0.062 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.033 0.000
Age 0.016 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.050 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.013 0.000
Number of jobs  0.075 0.001 0.078 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.071 0.000
Lagged number of employed weeks 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000
Lagged log real wages  0.835 0.001 0.884 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.915 0.000 0.920 0.000
R-squared 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.61
Sample size 4893023 4893023 4893023 4893023 4893023
Number of Individuals 433069 433069 433069 433069 433069
(1) Notes as in Table 2.  
 
 
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
9.799 0.004 9.910 0.003 10.011 0.003 10.136 0.003 10.325 0.004
-0.140 0.002 -0.084 0.001 -0.033 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.107 0.002
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
5373086 5373086 5373086 5373086 5373086
433069 433069 433069 433069 433069
0.421 0.001 0.740 0.002 1.218 0.002 1.845 0.003 2.746 0.005
0.014 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.054 0.001 0.087 0.001
0.031 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.109 0.000
0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.010 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000
0.071 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.129 0.000
-0.005 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.019 0.000
0.924 0.000 0.906 0.000 0.876 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.775 0.000
0.60 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.48
4893023 4893023 4893023 4893023 4893023






Table A2 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap  by Continent of Nationality
Variable coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
Intercept 9.617 0.010 6.020 0.013 1.722 0.008
EU (except A10) -0.067 0.010 0.031 0.007 0.029 0.003
A10 -0.424 0.022 -0.140 0.015 0.079 0.008
Europe (except EU) -0.019 0.030 0.028 0.022 0.056 0.008
Asia and Middle East -0.166 0.012 -0.116 0.009 0.001 0.003
North America 0.265 0.023 0.287 0.017 0.107 0.007
Central and South America -0.218 0.026 -0.097 0.018 0.005 0.008
Africa -0.165 0.013 -0.108 0.010 -0.006 0.004
Australasia and Oceania -0.036 0.017 0.109 0.013 0.046 0.006
Unknown -0.396 0.015 -0.085 0.011 0.003 0.004
Sex (male=1) 0.595 0.002 0.175 0.001
Age 0.048 0.000 0.021 0.000
Age squared  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.040 0.000 0.023 0.000
Number of jobs  0.347 0.003 0.202 0.002
Lagged number of employed weeks -0.005 0.000
Lagged log real earnings 0.667 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.49 0.72
Sample size 5373086 5366162 4893023
Number of individuals 433069 433069 433069

















Table A3 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap by Cohort of Arrival
Variable coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors coefficient s. errors
Intercept 9.604 0.010 6.051 0.013 1.722 0.008
1945-1949 arrivals  -0.247 0.022 -0.002 0.015 0.008 0.006
1950-1954 arrivals  -0.043 0.030 0.009 0.020 0.016 0.008
1955-1959 arrivals  0.022 0.026 0.009 0.018 0.017 0.007
1960-1964 arrivals  0.074 0.024 0.044 0.016 0.026 0.006
1965-1969 arrivals  0.174 0.023 0.137 0.016 0.055 0.006
1970-1974 arrivals  0.071 0.027 0.091 0.019 0.039 0.007
1975-1979 arrivals  -0.042 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.004
1980-1984 arrivals  -0.080 0.017 -0.008 0.013 0.012 0.005
1985-1989 arrivals  -0.138 0.014 -0.058 0.011 -0.005 0.004
1990-1994 arrivals  -0.257 0.014 -0.136 0.012 -0.017 0.005
1995-1999 arrivals  -0.250 0.013 -0.049 0.011 0.037 0.005
2000-2004 arrivals  -0.408 0.010 -0.094 0.008 0.086 0.004
2005 arrivals  -0.765 0.022 -0.211 0.017 0.440 0.018
Sex (male=1) 0.595 0.002 0.175 0.001
Age 0.048 0.000 0.021 0.000
Age squared  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.040 0.000 0.023 0.000
Number of jobs  0.347 0.003 0.202 0.002
Lagged number of employed weeks -0.005 0.000
Lagged log real earnings 0.668 0.001
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.49 0.72
Sample size 5373086 5366162 4893023
Number of individuals 433069 433069 433069



























Table A4 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap Across the Earnings Distribution by Gender
Variable coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Percentile 5th 10th 20th 30th 40th
Male
Intercept -1.915 0.008 -1.405 0.004 -0.818 0.002 -0.357 0.002 0.085 0.002
Immigrant (=1) -0.079 0.002 -0.031 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.000
Age 0.013 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.052 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.014 0.000
Number of jobs  0.073 0.001 0.078 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.075 0.000
Lagged number of employed weeks 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000
Lagged log real wages  0.861 0.001 0.898 0.000 0.919 0.000 0.923 0.000 0.925 0.000
R-squared 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.54
Sample size 2777556 2777556 2777556 2777556 2777556
Number of Individuals 234982 234982 234982 234982 234982
Female
Intercept -0.937 0.011 -0.921 0.007 -0.492 0.004 -0.079 0.004 0.250 0.003
Immigrant (=1) -0.041 0.002 -0.022 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001
Age 0.014 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.048 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.013 0.000
Number of jobs  0.082 0.001 0.083 0.001 0.084 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.070 0.000
Lagged number of employed weeks -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.000
Lagged log real wages  0.769 0.001 0.855 0.000 0.895 0.000 0.907 0.000 0.916 0.000
R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60
Sample size 2115467 2115467 2115467 2115467 2115467
Number of Individuals 198087 198087 198087 198087 198087
(1) Notes as in Table 2.  
 
coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
0.398 0.002 0.786 0.002 1.302 0.002 1.958 0.003 2.880 0.006
0.018 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.064 0.001 0.103 0.001
0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.009 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
0.069 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.099 0.000
-0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.020 0.000
0.927 0.000 0.910 0.000 0.880 0.000 0.843 0.000 0.785 0.001
0.53 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.44
2777556 2777556 2777556 2777556 2777556
234982 234982 234982 234982 234982
0.424 0.003 0.726 0.003 1.188 0.004 1.803 0.005 2.748 0.008
0.010 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.030 0.001 0.044 0.001 0.066 0.001
0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.000
0.078 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.166 0.000
-0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.017 0.000
0.921 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.865 0.000 0.822 0.000 0.753 0.001
0.59 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.47
2115467 2115467 2115467 2115467 2115467
198087 198087 198087 198087 198087  32 
 
Table A5 - Immigrant-Native Earnings  Gap  by Gender
Variable coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Intercept 1.736 0.011 1.848 0.012 1.731 0.011 1.843 0.012 1.729 0.011 1.842 0.012
Immigrant (=1) 0.024 0.002 0.026 0.002
EU (except A10) 0.029 0.004 0.028 0.004
A10 0.096 0.011 0.059 0.010
Europe (except EU) 0.059 0.010 0.062 0.014
Asia and Middle East -0.001 0.004 0.012 0.005
North America 0.118 0.009 0.089 0.010
Central and South America 0.004 0.011 -0.003 0.010
Africa -0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.006
Australasia and Oceania 0.032 0.008 0.056 0.008
Unknown 0.016 0.011 0.018 0.005
1945-1949 arrivals  0.046 0.013 0.017 0.006
1950-1954 arrivals  0.036 0.011 -0.003 0.011
1955-1959 arrivals  0.032 0.009 0.000 0.009
1960-1964 arrivals  0.038 0.008 0.007 0.009
1965-1969 arrivals  0.067 0.008 0.038 0.010
1970-1974 arrivals  0.051 0.010 0.030 0.010
1975-1979 arrivals  0.013 0.005 0.011 0.005
1980-1984 arrivals  0.016 0.007 0.008 0.007
1985-1989 arrivals  -0.011 0.006 0.003 0.006
1990-1994 arrivals  -0.028 0.007 -0.004 0.007
1995-1999 arrivals  0.017 0.007 0.060 0.007
2000-2004 arrivals  0.067 0.006 0.110 0.006
2005 arrivals  0.466 0.023 0.415 0.030
Age 0.027 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.012 0.000
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of employed weeks  0.023 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.024 0.000
Number of jobs  0.202 0.002 0.205 0.003 0.202 0.002 0.205 0.003 0.202 0.002 0.205 0.003
Lagged number of employed weeks -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.000
Lagged log real earnings 0.665 0.001 0.664 0.001 0.664 0.001 0.664 0.001 0.665 0.001 0.664 0.001
R-squared 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.72 0.65 0.72
Sample size 2777556 2115467 2777556 2115467 2777556 2115467
Number of individuals 234982 198087 234982 198087 234982 198087

























































































































































































Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database













































































Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database
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Figure 4 - Real Earnings Distribution
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Predicted Residuals from Regression Model in Column 3 of Table 2
Natives
Immigrants
Past Earnings and Past Employment
Controlling for Area and Time Fixed Effects, Gender, Age, Employment,
Figure 8 - Predicted Residuals
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Percentile of the Earnings Distribution
Controlling for Area and Time Fixed Effects
Controlling for Area and Time Fixed Effects, Gender, Age, Employment,
Past Earnings and Past Employment
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database

































































































































































































































































































































Past Earnings and Past Employment
Controlling for Area and Time Fixed Effects, Gender, Age, Employment,
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database























































































































































































































































































, Past Earnings and Past Employment
Controlling for Area and Time Fixed Effects, Gender, Age, Employment,
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database
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Percentile of the Earnings Distribution
Male
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Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database



























































































































































































































































































By Chohort of Arrival
Source: Lifetime Labour Market Database
Figure 13 - Immigrant-Native Earnings Gap by Gender
 
 
 